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WIUCH CAME FIRST, THE FRAUD OR THE
MARKET: IS THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-
MARKET THEORY VALID UNDER RULE 10B-5?
Peter J. Dennin*
It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can
even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all of
the people all the time.
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Joe Loofbourrow, president and founder of American
Space Corp. ("ASC"), 2 attempted to raise over one million dollars in a
public offering issued over the Internet. The effort was based on
misrepresentations on the company's website of plans to build a
massive aerospace manufacturing facility, to create a research center
in space that would discover every cure to every disease, and other
commercialized space activities.4 These fantastic claims, however,
were completely fictional.5 ASC had no physical offices, no contracts
with any potential client or supplier, and Loofbourrow had no
experience in the aerospace field.6 Additionally, there was no plan to
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Joseph B. Mick, Branch Chief, Boston District Office, United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, for his insight and advice, and my wife, Katherine, for all her
patience and support.
1. Abraham Lincoln, To a caller at the White House, From Alexander K.
McClure, Lincoln's Yarns and Stories (1904), reprinted in John Bartlett, Familiar
Quotations 451 (16th ed., 1992).
2. In re Joe Loofbourrow, Exchange Act Release No. 41,631 (July 21, 1999),
available at http:/wwvw.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-41631.htm.
3. A public offering is the sale of a security available to the general public.
Black's Law Dictionary 1111-12 (7th ed. 1999).
4. In re Joe Loofbourrow, Exchange Act Release No. 41,631 (July 21, 1999),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-41631.htm. ASC was both selling
"financial partner" interests and offering "free stock," supposedly valued at one
dollar per share. Id. Fortunately, while many individuals signed up for the free stock,
no investors actually purchased any of the offered securities. Id. Loofbourrow later
admitted in his Offer of Settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission,





operate ASC as a legitimate enterprise at any time.7  ASC's
unsuccessful public offering was apparently a complete sham.
If investors had lost money and subsequently tried to pursue a
private cause of action for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")8 against ASC or
Joe Loofbourrow, in some jurisdictions plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate reliance on the company's misrepresentations. In a class
action scenario, each member would therefore have to independently
prove his or her respective reliance, making class certification
onerous, if not impossible.9 Other jurisdictions, however, recognize
the fraud-created-the-market theory, which presumes reliance on the
misrepresentations and therefore makes class certification a realistic
method of recovery.
Under the fraud-created-the-market theory, investors may rely on
the presence of the securities in the market as an indication that the
securities are marketable, rather than relying on disclosure
statements.1°  "Unmarketable" securities are those issued only
because of the issuer's intentional fraud."' The fraud-created-the-
market theory was established to allow investors to recoup losses
incurred in the primary markets, rather than only in efficient
secondary markets.13
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash to regulate
the entry and conduct of participants in the market. 4 It was charged
with the primary responsibility of policing the securities markets for
fraudulent offerings, trading irregularities, and market manipulation,
as well as any other activity that undermines the integrity of the
7. Id.
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). For the complete text of Rule 10b-5, infra note
39.
9. Class certification is the process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which allows for a significant number of plaintiffs or defendants to bring or defend
against one lawsuit. See Jack H. Friedenthal, et al., Civil Procedure 736-37, 759-63 (3d
ed. 1999).
10. Infra notes 34, 102 (explaining disclosure statements).
11. Infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
12. Infra note 31 (defining primary markets).
13. Plaintiffs are allowed to presume reliance in efficient secondary markets under
the fraud-on-the-market theory. See infra Part I.B.2. For a definition of secondary
market, see infra note 32.
14. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 6-9 (3d ed. 1996); see
also Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 407-60 (1990) (providing a detailed description of the
creation of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act, focusing on the
Exchange Act); David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation
Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"), 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1781, 1783-85 (2000) (providing an overview of the
history of Rule 10b-5).
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market.15  Although other regulatory bodies, such as NASD
Regulation, Inc., 6 work in conjunction with the SEC, it is still
impossible for the SEC to prevent or later prosecute every fraudulent
activity in the market. 7 Accordingly, private causes of action expand
the remedies available to defrauded investors.
Private causes of action under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act have
developed through the courts over the last fifty-five years' The
Supreme Court has stated "that private enforcement of [SEC] rules
may '[provide] a necessary supplement to [SEC] action,"' and has
developed the law with an eye toward providing investors-turned-
private-plaintiffs with a flexible method of pursuing relief for their
injuries." As a result, while a plaintiff once had to prove the
defendant's fraudulent intent, material misstatement or omission,
causation, and specifically, the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's
wrongful act in effecting the transaction, courts have eased the
plaintiff's burden by presuming reliance in certain situations?' Two
universally accepted presumptions of reliance are the Affiliated Ute
presumption1 and the fraud-on-the-market theory,-- both of which
the Supreme Court has affirmed. A derivative of the fraud-on-the-
market theory is the fraud-created-the-market theory, which several
federal circuits have adopted. 3
The fraud-created-the-market theory allows a court to presume
reliance if the plaintiff has relied on the market itself to prevent the
entry of unmarketable securities.24 In other words, if not for the
15. See supra note 14 (discussing the responsibilities of the SEC).
16. NASD Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR") is the regulatory arm of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, better known as the NASD. NASDR is a self-
regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over the thousands of registered broker-
dealers as well as the NASDAQ over-the-counter-market. NASD Regulation, Who
We Are, available at http//www.nasdr.com2200.htm; see also infra note 32 (discussing
over-the-counter markets).
17. See infra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
19. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (second
alteration in original). The Court reinforced its position thirteen years later in Basic
Inc v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), stating that private causes of action are "an
essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements." Id. at 231.
20. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing the various aspects of
a private plaintiff's burden of proof); infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the reliance requirement in Rule lob-5 private causes of action).
21. The Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance is based upon the premise that if an
issuer intentionally fails to disclose material information regarding itself, a private
plaintiff injured by that omission need not establish actual reliance, because reliance
is presumed by the court. See infra Part I.B.1 for discussion.
22. Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, the court presumes reliance if the
defendant materially and intentionally misrepresented information that affected the
market price of the security, which in turn caused the plaintiff's loss because of the
plaintiff's reliance on the ability of the market to provide a valid price. See infra Part
I.B.2 for discussion.
23. Infra Parts I.C, II.A.
24. Infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
2001] 2613
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defendant's fraud, there would be no market for that security to be
issued into and subsequently traded upon because the security has no
underlying value. The federal circuit courts are currently split on
whether to accept the theory as a valid presumption of reliance.
Certain circuits hold that plaintiffs may validly rely on the market to
prevent such fraud, while other circuits fear that such a presumption
contradicts the original intent of the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") and the Exchange Act (collectively the "Acts") to
simply provide disclosure to investors without guaranteeing a
security's valueY These circuits also fear that such a presumption of
reliance will potentially open the floodgates for plaintiffs to bring such
suits. Moreover, even those circuits that apply the theory differ in
their applications.26 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue.
This Note discusses whether, in private plaintiff causes of action for
securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act27 the fraud-created-the-market theory is a valid presumption of
reliance. Part I provides background information on Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act and, in particular, it discusses the requirement of
plaintiffs to prove reliance, the creation by the courts of the initial
presumption of reliance theories as precursors to the fraud-created-
the-market theory, and the Fifth Circuit's development of the fraud-
created-the-market theory. Part II examines the subsequent decisions
that have led to the circuit split, while analyzing the variations in the
courts' applications of the theory. Part III argues that the theory, as
applied by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, is both valid and necessary to
ensure the original purpose of the Exchange Act, because it provides
investors with a flexible mechanism for combating securities fraud. In
addition, the circuits that ostensibly reject the theory may be
misapplying it. Finally, this Note contends that the continued
existence of scams and fraudulent investment schemes, exacerbated
by the ease with which such activity can be perpetrated on the
Internet, in addition to conventional methods, has made the fraud-
created-the-market theory a necessary tool for plaintiffs' recovery.
25. For a discussion of the courts accepting the fraud-created-the-market theory,
see infra Parts I.C, I.A. For a discussion of the courts rejecting the theory, see infra
Part Il.B.
26. See infra Parts II.A-B.
27. See infra notes 36, 39 (providing the complete text of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5).
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I. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 10 AND RULE 1OB-5 OF THE
EXCHANGE ACT
A. General History of Rule lOb-5
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress passed the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.21 In effecting such legislation,
Congress intended to reduce, if not eliminate, the significant amount
of stock fraud and manipulation that had contributed to the crash?21
The Acts aimed to reinforce investor confidence in the market and
gain a measure of control over the quality of investments being
offered and traded.30 The Securities Act chiefly targeted initial
offerings of securities in the primary market, 1 while the Exchange Act
focused on the subsequent buying and selling of securities in the
secondary market.3 Both Acts require issuers of securities to disclose
their companies' finances, operations, competitors, equity currently
issued, and any other information necessary for investors to make an
informed decision about whether to trade in the security.3 One of the
general goals of Section 5 of the Securities Act,"' and the Securities
Act as a whole, is to ensure that parties have sufficient and accurate
28. See supra note 14.
29. See Thel, supra note 14, at 408-13 (describing other contributing factors in the
stock market crash, including massive speculation, aggressive short-selling, and the
actions of officers of major investment banks, who transacted in large blocks and
purposely affected the price of stocks they personally held); see also Escoffery, supra
note 14, at 1783-84 (stating that "manipula[tion] and deceptive trading practices...
significantly contributed to the" 1928 crash). Short selling is the "sale of a security...
not owned by the seller.... If the seller can buy that stock later at a lower price, a
profit results; if the price rises, however, a loss results." John Downes & Jordan Elliot
Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 407 (3d ed. 1991).
30. Escoffery, supra note 14, at 1784.
31. Hazen, supra note 14, at 7. Primary markets are the "market[s] for new issues
of securities," Downes & Goodman, supra note 29, at 335, such as initial public
offerings.
32. See Hazen, supra note 14, at 8. Secondary markets are "exchanges and over-
the-counter markets where securities are bought and sold subsequent to original
issuance." Downes & Goodman, supra note 29, at 394. An over-the-counter market
("OTC market") is a "market in which securities transactions are conducted through
a telephone and computer network connecting dealers in [securities], rather than on
the floor of an exchange." Id. at 306. OTC markets, typically used by smaller
companies, have become popular with technology firms that do not meet the
requirements to be listed on a stock exchange.
33. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(aa) (1994) (detailing the information required in
registration statements).
34. Section 5 of the Securities Act requires that all security offerings be registered
with the SEC through a series of disclosure documents. Id. at § 77(e) (1994).
Disclosure documents typically include detailed descriptions of the issuing entity and
its finances, operations, personnel and goals as well as the security being issued. See
id at § 77(g) (1994); id. at § 77(aa) (1994). See generally Hazen, supra note 14, 163-66
(noting that there are certain exceptions to registration requirements, for example,
Section 3 creates exempt securities, such as government bonds, while Section 4
creates exempt transactions, such as limited offerings to accredited investors).
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information about securities on which to rely for their investment
decisions."
Section 10(b) is the general anti-fraud provision of the Exchange
Act.36 Under the auspices of Section 10(b),37 the Securities and
Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5, 8 which makes it
illegal to defraud by any means or method, or to make material
omissions or misstatements of material facts in connection with a
securities transaction.39
Originally, only the federal government was entitled to bring an
action under Rule lOb-5 because the rule did not expressly grant
private parties the right to do so.40 In 1946, however, federal court in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first recognized private causes of
action under Rule 106-5 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.41 The
Kardon court based its decision primarily on the torts of deceit and
misrepresentation under common law.42 The court noted that while
35. See Hazen, supra note 14, at 78.
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section
10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
37. Id. (providing "rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors").
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
39. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
40. See Hazen, supra note 14, at 764.
41. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
42. The court held that when one violates a law which is intended to "'protect an
interest' of another it creates liability between the parties. Id. at 513 (quoting
Restatement of Torts, Vol. 2, § 286 (1934)). The court relied on the legal maxim,
"Ubi jus ibi remedium." Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39-40 (1916)). That maxim translates to "[w]here there is a right, there is a remedy."
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there is no express language in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
granting private parties the power to file civil suits for securities fraud,
"the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies."4 3 More than two
decades later, the Supreme Court resolved any questions regarding
the legitimacy of private causes of action in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., I by noting "[ilt is now
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b). '4 5
While the Kardon court failed to provide specific guidance
regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof, subsequent federal courts
developed the necessary elements of common law fraud that are now
applied to civil securities fraud suits under Rule 10b-5. A plaintiff
must show that the defendant (1) "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security"47 (2) acted with scienter" (3) by misstating or
failing to disclose (4) a material fact 9 (5) "upon which the plaintiff
justifiably relied" (6) "that proximately caused [the] plaintiff's"
injury."0 In proving the element of reliance, courts require plaintiffs to
establish that they directly relied on a material misrepresentation.,
Historically, plaintiffs' only option was to prove that they had relied
on disclosure materials, such as prospectuses and annual statements,
by showing either a material misstatement in the materials or an
omission of a material fact from disclosure statements, which caused
the plaintiff's injury through either the purchase or sale of the
security.52  Proving actual reliance on the defendant's
Black's Law Dictionary 1695 (7th ed. 1999).
43. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514. The court felt that because Congress did not
clearly withhold the right to file private civil suits under Section 10(b), and because
the right to recover for harm caused by the violation of a law is "so fundamental and
so deeply ingrained," such a right exists. Id.
44. 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (deciding that the plaintiff, as an investor, was harmed
financially because of the defendant's fraud in the sale of securities and entitled to a
civil remedy under Section 10(b)).
45. Id at 13 n.9.
46. See, eg., Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996)
(describing the plaintiff's burden of proof in a Rule lOb-5 cause of action).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (holding that only parties who have bought or sold a security may
pursue relief through a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5).
48. The Supreme Court established the requirement of scienter in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 201 (1976) (interpreting the language of Section
10(b) to imply that deceptive intent is necessary). Scienter is "[a] mental state
consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Black's Law Dictionary
1347 (7th ed. 1999).
49. See infra note 61.
50. Gasner, 103 F.3d at 356 (describing the plaintiff's burden in Rule lOb-5 private
actions).
51. See id. For a description of the other five requirements, see Escoffery, supra
note 14, at 1786-93.
52. Reliance is a fact-specific inquiry, and courts generally look to the following
factors, as enumerated in Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983):
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities
20011 2617
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misrepresentation was considered a necessary part of a plaintiff's
claim because it is the "causal connection" that links the plaintiff's loss
to the defendant's act or omission.53  Reliance, or "transaction
causation," requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's
misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to purchase or sell the
security.54
Courts have allowed private plaintiffs to use various methods to
establish both actual and presumed reliance. Courts presume reliance
in situations where proving actual reliance would be too burdensome
on the plaintiff or irrelevant to the specific cause of action.55
Specifically, the Supreme Court has approved two presumptions of
reliance, the Affiliated Ute Presumption56 and the fraud-on-the-market
theory.57
B. Universally Accepted Presumptions of Reliance
1. The Affiliated Ute Presumption
In the landmark case of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the
Supreme Court presumed a private plaintiff's reliance on a
defendant's misrepresentations rather than requiring proof of actual
reliance. The Affiliated Ute Court found that the defendants violated
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) of the Exchange Act58 because they failed to
disclose material information to individuals for whom they traded
matters; (2) the existence of long standing business or personal relationships;
(3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the
fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff initiated the [securities] transaction or sought
to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the
misrepresentations.
Id. at 1516.
53. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (stating also that there are
multiple methods to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof).
54. Hazen, supra note 14, at 816-17 & n.8. Reliance and proximate causation are
closely related concepts and are therefore often misapplied. See id. Proximate cause,
or loss causation, requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's misrepresentation
in fact caused the security to be improperly valued in the market, which in turn
caused the plaintiff's actual financial harm. McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820-21
(9th Cir. 1992); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31
(1975) (holding that the plaintiff, in order to bring a civil suit under Rule lOb-5, must
have purchased or sold the security at issue); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing different elements of causation in Rule
10b-5 actions). See generally Tower C. Snow, Jr., et al., Defending Securities Class
Action, in ALI-ABA Course of Study 789, 819-21 (2000) (discussing the causation
requirement).
55. Infra text accompanying note 69.
56. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); see
discussion infra Part I.B.1.
57. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-49; see discussion infra Part I.B.2.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
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stock.59 The Supreme Court held that "positive proof of reliance is
not a prerequisite to recovery" in cases alleging a defendant's failure
to disclose.60 Instead, a plaintiff must only show that the non-
disclosed information was material,61 because a "reasonable investor"
would rely on that information in his or her decision-making.62 The
tenor of the Court's opinion indicated that securities fraud cases
brought under Rule 10b-5 require a certain amount of flexibility in
proving reliance, as evidenced by the Court's statement that, "[w]e do
not read Rule 10b-5 restrictively. '
2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson: The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
The Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance grants plaintiffs a narrow
presumption, applicable only in situations where defendants allegedly
failed to disclose material information. Yet in Blackie v. Barrack.'
the Ninth Circuit chose to expand the reliance doctrine beyond a
defendant's material omission to include situations of affirmative
material misrepresentation.
The Blackie court was the first to expressly remove the requirement
that a plaintiff prove actual reliance on a defendant's affirmative and
misrepresentative statements. In Blackie, the court stated that an
investor "relies generally on the supposition that the market price is
validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially
inflated the price."65 By affirmatively misrepresenting the financial
condition of their company, thereby causing the market to overvalue
the stock price, the defendants had committed a fraud on the market
as a whole.6
59. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152-54. Two of the defendants, Gale and
Haslem, worked at the bank that was acting as the transfer agent for the sale of stock
from mixed-blood members of the Ute tribe to non-native American buyers. See id. at
145-47. Gale and Haslem did not disclose to the sellers that they were receiving
commissions and gratuities for each sale and that the market price of the stock was
upwards of $200 per share higher in the non-native American market. See id. at 147,
153.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Materiality is a question of fact. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 239-40; Hazen,
supra note 14, at 797. Federal courts have referred to the Restatement of Torts for a
clear definition of materiality to be applied to Rule lob-5 cases. See List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that the "basic test of
'materiality'... is whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact
misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question'"
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Hazen, supra note 14, at 793-95.
62. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
63. Id. at 152. This is consistent with one of the points the Supreme Court made
just one year earlier in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court in Superintendent stated that "Section 10(b) must
be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Id. at 12.
64. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 907.
66. Id. at 894, 902-08.
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The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's new doctrine in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,67 ruling that the plaintiffs' presumption of reliance
based on the fraud-on-the-market theory was valid.' The Court held
that "[r]equiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, i.e.,
how he would have acted.., if the misrepresentation had not been
made, would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on
the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market" 69
and that "'the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs
the operation of the markets as indices of real value."'7
Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, instead of demonstrating
actual reliance on information contained in a prospectus, a plaintiff
satisfies the reliance requirement by showing that the market price of
the security as a whole was affected by the defendant's misstatement
or omission, and that the plaintiff suffered a loss due to a transaction
at that incorrect price.7 This theory presumes that there is an
efficient secondary market7" and that the market has incorporated the
defendant's actions into the price of the security in question.73
67. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Plaintiffs, former Basic Inc. shareholders, claimed that
Basic Inc.'s three denials of a potential merger were material misrepresentations. Id.
at 227-28. The defendants, just months after the denials, announced the buy-out of its
stock by another company. Id. Plaintiffs sold shares prior to the merger
announcement at allegedly undervalued market price because of the market's
reliance on the denials of the merger. Id. at 228. Generally, a merger announcement
will cause an increase in the target company's stock price because the acquiring
company pays higher than market value for the shares (called a premium). See Robert
W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell 370 (4th ed. 1996); see also
Lewis D. Solomon, et al., Corporations Law and Policy: Materials and Problems 1170-
73 (4th ed. 1998). Plaintiffs alleged that if the defendants had either remained silent
or confirmed the merger negotiations, Basic Inc.'s share price would have been higher
when plaintiffs sold it. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 228.
68. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 250.
69. Id. at 245 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 246 (quoting the Congressional record, see H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 11
(1934), discussing the drafting of the Exchange Act).
71. See id. at 246-47.
72. Supra note 32 (defining secondary market); see Hazen, supra note 14, at 813;
see also Marc I. Steinberg, Understanding Securities Law 196 (2d ed. 1996). The Sixth
Circuit provided a general list of the elements of an efficient secondary market in
Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990). They are as follows:
(1) a large weekly trading volume; (2) the existence of a significant number
of reports by securities analysts; (3) the existence of market makers and
arbitragers in the security; (4) the eligibility of the company to file an S-3
Registration Statement; and (5) a history of immediate movement of the
stock price caused by unexpected corporate events or financial releases.
Id. at 199. See generally Russell Robinson, Comment, Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
and Thinly-Traded Securities Under Rule lOb-5: How does a Court Decide if a Stock
Market is Efficient?, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223,247-51 (1990) (discussing the factors
that comprise an efficient market). But see generally Victor L. Bernard et al.,
Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 781 (1994) (questioning the fraud-on-the-market
theory based on empirical studies of efficient markets).
Plaintiffs, however, are not required to prove all of those factors conclusively in
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While this theory eases the plaintiff's evidentiary burden, the
defendant is not completely without defenses. The Supreme Court
expressly created the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to
be rebuttable.74 In Basic Inc., the Court established a general
standard for defendants to rebut the presumption by allowing "[a]ny
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation
and either the price received (or paid) ... or his decision to trade."75
The defendant must show there was material information disclosed to
the public with sufficient availability to counter-act or correct the
misrepresentation.76 The Court enumerated specific examples of how
to rebut a plaintiff's reliance, such as a market maker's" knowledge of
a potential merger, or if the news of the merger entered the market
through alternate, but credible, sources.78
The fraud-on-the-market theory is especially useful for plaintiffs in
class actions. It allows the class to certify even if there are different
levels of reliance among its members because it creates a presumption
of reliance for the entire class.79 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require that all members of a class have a common question of law or
fact that predominates over individual questions.' Without the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance, a group of plaintiffs consisting
of some members who have read and relied on a disclosure statement,
order to establish that an efficient market exists. See Freeman, 915 F2d at 199;
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that there is no clear
test to determine "whether a stock trades in an 'open and efficient market'");
Steinberg, supra, at 196.
73. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 247.
74. Id. at 250; Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting
that the general view is that the presumption of reliance is a rebuttable one);
Steinberg, supra note 72, at 197; see also In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d
1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that misleading statements made by corporate
insiders must be countered by sufficiently credible and public information to prevent
Rule 10b-5 liability). There is an argument, however, that it is nearly impossible for a
defendant to effectively rebut this presumption in class action cases, because when
reliance is determined to exist as a matter of law for a class, there is no rebuttable
element. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,399-
400 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the
Supreme Court, by not remanding in two previous cases involving material
misrepresentations, "established a rule of law rather than a 'presumption'").
75. Basic Inc, 485 U.S. at 248.
76. See Apple, 886 F.2d at 1116.
77. A market maker is a broker-dealer who creates a market in a security.
Making a market is to "maintain firm bid and offer prices in a given security by
standing ready to buy or sell round lots at publicly quoted prices." Downes &
Goodman, supra note 29, at 239 (emphasis omitted).
78. Basic Inc, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
79. See Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722-25 (11th Cir. 1987);
Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created The Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Ertension
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 359, 370 (1995). See generally
Snow, supra note 54, at 931-36.
80. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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and other members who have not, could not be certified as a class.8' If
the potential class as a whole is allowed to substitute a presumption of
reliance for actual individual reliance, a significant procedural barrier
is therefore removed. Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is
irrelevant whether each plaintiff has read a company's disclosure
statements, because the manipulated stock price itself is the fraud.
Although the fraud-on-the-market theory acts to remedy a
defendant's wrongdoings in an efficient secondary market, plaintiffs
lacked a similar tool to combat fraud in the primary market.s2 As a
result, a number of courts have extended the presumption of reliance
to newly-issued securities in the primary market through the fraud-
created-the-market theory.
C. Shores v. Sklar: The Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory of
Reliance
Under the fraud-created-the-market theory, a plaintiff relies on the
market itself to prevent unmarketable securities from even being
issued. In order for a security to be issued, a company must first
disclose to the public material information regarding both the issuing
company, and the security being issued.83 Such disclosure provides
potential purchasers with the appropriate information to make their
investment decisions.8' Because the SEC does not perform due
diligence to ensure that the disclosures are accurate, 5 companies
might intentionally misrepresent their financial strength, thus causing
invalid securities to be issued into the market. Ultimately, if the SEC
cannot prevent fraudulent securities from being issued, purchasers
may only recoup losses from such fraudulent schemes through private
causes of action 86 under Rule 10b-5.
81. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 242.
82. See Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000); Ross v. Bank
South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858
F.2d 1104, 1121 (5th Cir. 1988). As noted in Basic Inc., active secondary markets, by
incorporating material and relevant information into a securities price, provide
investors with a basis for reliance on that price. See supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text. In primary markets, the investor relies on the issuing parties for
pricing accuracy based on the financial strength of the issue. The focus of the fraud-
created-the-market theory, as discussed below, is not that the issuer mispriced the
security, but that the security should not have been issued at all. See infra Part I.C.
The fraud-created-the-market theory has been applied to the primary market, and
may potentially apply to inefficient secondary markets. Lipton v. Documation, Inc.,
734 F.2d 740, 746 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984); cf Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 467 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (noting that while the district court held that the securities in question
were purchased in the primary market, the circuit court stated that it was not so clear
from the record, and that the bonds may have been trading in a secondary market).
83. Solomon et al., supra note 67, at 280-81; see supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 33-34 and accompany text.
85. Infra note 138.
86. See Solomon et al, supra note 67, at 281.
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Rule 10b-5 has three distinct provisions prohibiting fraudulent
devices or schemes, material misrepresentations and omissions, and
operating fraudulent practices.' The court in Shores v. Sklar stated
that in claims arising under Rule 10b-5(b), which include a
"statement" by the defendant, plaintiffs are not allowed to presume
reliance." Only causes of action alleging violations of Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c) are eligible to receive a presumption of reliance.' The court
relied on the general language of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) in holding that
plaintiffs need not read and rely on disclosure documents."1 In
contrast, Rule 10b-5(b) requires a plaintiff to have read and relied on
a defendant's fraudulent statements because the specific language of
Rule 10b-5(b) requires an "untrue statement" by the defendant. 2
The central focus of the fraud-created-the-market theory is the
concept of unmarketability. If a security should not have been issued
and could not have been issued, if not for the intentional fraud of a
party, it is unmarketable, because the security is essentially
worthless.93 Plaintiffs are granted a presumption of reliance by the
court because actual reliance on sham disclosure materials is
irrelevant. The plaintiff has not relied on disclosure documents to
ascertain whether in fact the security is a sham because the very
presence of the security and its accompanying disclosure materials
indicates that the security is bona fide.' As a result, investors rely on
such materials to ascertain the fair market value of a security, while
relying on the presence of a security in the market as an indication
that it is not a sham.95
Accordingly, in Shores, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could
avoid proving actual reliance if he or she could show that:
(1) the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the
market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud
purchasers, (2) [plaintiff] reasonably relied on the [securities']
availability on the market as an indication of their apparent
87. For the complete text of Rule 10b-5. see supra note 39. The current version of
Rule 10b-5 uses (a), (b) and (c) to denote its subsections, while the older version of
Rule 10b-5 that was in force at the time of Shores used (1), (2) and (3) respectively.
88. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
89. Id. at 468-69.
90. Id. at 469-70. Under both Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), "causation in fact... [is]
proved [if] the scheme was intended to and did bring the [blonds onto the market
fraudulently" and the plaintiffs proved reliance "on the integrity of the offerings of
the securities market." Id. at 469. In comparison, Rule 10b-5(b) states that it is illegal
"[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2000).
91. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b); Shores, 647 F.2d at 468-69.





genuineness, and (3) as a result of the scheme to defraud, [plaintiff]
suffered a loss.
9 6
This case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit set forth the fraud-
created-the-market theory. The plaintiffs were purchasers of
municipal revenue bonds, 97 which dropped sharply in value shortly
after their purchase. 98 This price decrease was caused by the default
of the bond's underlying income source in paying the rent supporting
the bonds.99 The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the
issuers of the bond were perpetrating a fraud on investors by
misrepresenting the ability of the underlying project to produce the
revenue needed to pay off the bonds.' The fraud-created-the-market
theory applied because the plaintiffs were not recovering under a
claim that they had purchased intentionally mispriced bonds, but
rather that they had purchased bonds that should not have been
issued or sold in the first place.' The lower court granted summary
judgment to the defendants based on the plaintiffs' admission that
they failed to read the offering circular1" prior to purchasing the
bonds."3 The Fifth Circuit, however, sitting en banc with ten judges
dissenting, vacated the district court's holding"° and held that the
plaintiffs need only establish reliance on the security's market
availability to meet the reliability requirement in a fraud cause of
96. Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted).
97. Municipal revenue bonds are "bond[s] issued to finance public works.., and
supported directly by the revenues of the project .... Unless otherwise specified...
holders of these bonds have no claim on the issuer's other resources." Downes &
Goodman, supra note 29, at 266. The bonds in the present case were a specific type of
municipal revenue bond called Industrial Development Bonds, which are "issued to
finance fixed assets that are then leased to private firms, whose payments [pay down]
the debt." Id. at 199 (emphasis omitted). In Shores, the revenue bonds were bonds of
the Industrial Development Board of Frisco City, Alabama. 647 F.2d at 465. They
were issued under Alabama state law that provided for the incorporation of an
Industrial Development Board ("Board") by cities to secure financing for the
construction of industrial facilities. Id. The municipality leases the facility to a
company looking to operate industrial sites in Alabama. Id. These bonds were
secured by the revenue of the lease of the industrial facility, and liability was limited
to the Board, not the city. Id.
98. Shores, 647 F.2d at 463-64. The court noted that it was unclear whether the
bonds were purchased in the primary or secondary markets, despite the district
court's holding that they were purchased in the primary market. Id. at 467.
99. See id. at 463-64.
100. Id. at 466-67 (noting, as examples, that the defendants claimed they had prior
success in this field, that there was a multi-million dollar property owned by the
defendants to build the project on, and that they overstated the value of assets on the
company's balance sheet included in the offering documents).
101. See id. at 470-71.
102. An offering circular, or prospectus, is a "formal written offer to sell securities
that sets forth the plan for a proposed business enterprise." Downes & Goodman,
supra note 29, at 289, 341; see also supra note 32.
103. Shores, 647 F.2d at 464.
104. Id. at 464, 472.
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action. 5 The court stated that the legislative intent of the Exchange
Act was to create a broad source of protection against securities fraud
and to promote general standards of "honesty and fair dealing."'' The
court established a standard for certain securities to receive this form
of reliance presumption because without the intentional fraud the
securities could not have been issued. 7 The presumption of reliance
was to be allowed for securities "not entitled to be marketed." ' -
The dissent in Shores questioned the majority's interpretation of the
original intent of the Exchange Act, arguing that the purpose of that
Act was to create informed investors, not to guarantee a security's
value simply because it is in the market.' The dissent also voiced the
concern that this particular presumption of reliance would open the
floodgates to federal causes of action and further prolong frivolous
litigation that would have otherwise been resolved at summary
judgment.110
Since Shores, courts have significantly refined the exact definition
of an "unmarketable" security, most notably regarding the creation of
two classifications of unmarketability, economic and legal."'
Economic unmarketability focuses on whether a security has any
underlying financial value, specifically, whether the underlying
company exists and has any assets. 12 Legal unmarketability, on the
other hand, focuses on whether the entity issuing the security
complied with regulatory procedures required to issue that type of
security.113 Under the legal unmarketability standard, a company may
have assets, but has failed to comply with one or all of the legal
requirements. Both economic and legal unmarketability require
fraudulent intention on the part of the issuer."' The circuits that
subsequently have applied the fraud-created-the-market theory's
presumption of reliance have clarified their individual interpretations
of the proper application of it, while the courts that follow the
dissent's reasoning in Shores have accordingly rejected the theory.
105. Id. at 469-70.
106. Id. at 470 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976));
infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the legislative intent of the Exchange Act). The
Supreme Court in Ernst referred directly to a House of Representatives Report in
describing the intent and design of the Exchange Act. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195
(referencing H.R. Rep. No. 792-73, at 1-5 (1934)).
107. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 469-70.
108. Id at 469.
109. Id. at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting); see also Herzog, supra note 79, at 396-403
(discussing how the fraud-created-the-market theory undermines the intent of federal
securities law).
110. Shores, 647 F.2d at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting).
111. See, eg., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155. 1163-64, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000)
(describing the different types of unmarketable securities).
112. Id at 1164.
113. Id
114. Supra note 48.
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II. THE CIRCUITS' DISAGEEMENT OVER THE PROPER APPLICATION
OF THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET THEORY
While some federal courts since Shores have continued to apply the
fraud-created-the-market theory, they have differed on its exact
application. Specifically, the circuits have diverged on the degree of
flexibility that is required when courts are determining what amount
of underlying assets in a company prevents that company's securities
from being economically unmarketable or "patently worthless". The
Third, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits established that their standard for
''patently worthless" requires that there be no assets in the company
underlying the security in question, while the Fifth Circuit allows for a
certain degree of flexibility in the amount of assets. The Fifth Circuit
focuses more on the intention of the issuer rather than an absolute
dollar amount. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have apparently
rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory, in part because of their
possible misinterpretation of Shores and in part because of insufficient
facts in the cases before them that were needed to properly apply the
theory.
A. Circuit Courts Adopting the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory
Subsequent to Shores, the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
adopted versions of the Fifth Circuit's fraud-created-the-market
theory, while the Fifth Circuit continues to tie its version to whether a
security is "worthless."" 5  None of the circuits, however, has
wholeheartedly embraced the doctrine, but rather they apply it in
narrow circumstances. The Ninth Circuit's presumption of reliance
theory, established prior to Shores, significantly differs from the other
circuits' fraud-created-the-market doctrines, and is thus labeled
"reliance on the regulatory body."'1 6
1. The Fifth Circuit
Six years after Shores, the Fifth Circuit took the first small step
towards clarifying its requirements for unmarketability under the
fraud-created-the-market theory in Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp."'
In Finkel, the court reiterated that plaintiffs can be relieved of the
burden of proving direct reliance on a defendant's
misrepresentation" s The court stated that private plaintiffs could
instead show that the issuers "conspired to bring to market securities
115. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988).
116. Infra Part II.A.5.
117. 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, through
the use of over-inflated inventory valuations and an intentional delay in reporting
losses caused by the over-inflation, intentionally manipulated the stock's market




that were not entitled to be marketed."' 9 It further held that the
majority in Shores intended to allow the use of the Basic Inc.
presumption of reliance"0 in situations involving the "issuance of
worthless securities." 2' The Finkel court ultimately decided the issue
under the fraud-on-the-market theory, rather than the fraud-created-
the-market theory, because the security in question had some worth
and in fact, was actively traded in an over-the-counter market.'2 The
Finkel court clarified that Shores applied the fraud-on-the-market
theory to "newly issued securities."' ' In Finkel, because of the crucial
fact that the securities traded on a secondary market, the plaintiff
could claim a presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market
theory. 24 This active secondary market allowed the plaintiff to allege
that the defendant's fraudulent actions merely inflated the price,
rather than caused an unmarketable security to enter the market.2'
The Fifth Circuit further clarified its definition of unmarketable
securities in the fraud-created-the-market theory context the
following year in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.'2 6  While the
defendants in Abell stated that a "worthless" security meant that
investors did not recoup any of their investment, plaintiffs claimed a
security was worthless if the issuers intended to operate a sham
corporation. 27 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, stating "that
securities meet the test of 'not entitled to be marketed' only where the
promoters knew the enterprise itself was patently worthless," and
here the defendants had no plans to operate an actual business.'18 The
119. Id. at 362.
120. Supra Part I.B.2.
121. Finkel, 817 F.2d at 364.
122. Id. at 364-65.
123. Id. at 364.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff class claimed that the defendants
fraudulently issued municipal revenue bonds to finance construction of a facility for
the disabled. See id. at 1109, 1111-12. Most importantly, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants claimed that one party had pledged two million dollars to support the
project, and that they omitted the complete details of a multi-million dollar real estate
deal involving parties at the heart of the project. Id. at 1111-12.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Abell in 1989, vacating the judgment and
remanding in light of H.J. Inc v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989),
which concerned racketeering standards under RICO. The Court remanded the cases
on this issue only. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 946
F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court did not comment on any other
aspect of the Abell decision.
127. See Abell, 858 F.2d at 1121-22. The plaintiffs based their definition of
"worthless" on the defendant's intent and not the assets underlying the company
because in Shores, the plaintiffs had received a portion of their initial investment
through the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.; Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1981).
128. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122. The term "patently worthless," introduced by the
Abell court, was subsequently labeled by other courts as "economic unmarketability."
See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Abell court's definition of "patently worthless" allowed for a certain
degree of flexibility regarding the existence of actual assets in the
underlying business.129 The court found that the bonds in question
were not traded on an active market,130 which prevented them from
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Additionally, the
securities were not completely worthless or issued only because of the
fraud, because the bonds had some "legitimate value in the bond
market," which prevented the plaintiffs from asserting the fraud-
created-the-market theory.t31  Thus, the plaintiffs' claims were
denied.32
The Fifth Circuit continues to interpret the fraud-created-the-
market theory consistently with Abell.
2. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit was the first to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Shores in T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma
Irrigation Fuel Authority.'33 The court upheld the fraud-created-the-
market theory, stating that "[w]e find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Shores v. Sklar to be persuasive."" It ruled that plaintiffs' reliance on
the bond's presence in the market satisfied the elements of reliance on
the defendant's misrepresentation.'35 The district court had found
that the Irrigation Fuel Authority was not a properly formed public
trust because it had failed to comply with numerous requirements of
state law regarding public trusts. 3 6 The Tenth Circuit thus stated that
129. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122 (noting that in Shores there were actual capital assets,
but that did not prevent the court from declaring the bonds to be unmarketable).
130. Id. at 1121. As opposed to its decision in Finkel, the court in Abell noted that
the facts before it were significantly similar to those in Shores, most importantly that
the bonds were not trading on an efficient secondary market. Id.
131. Id. at 1122-23.
132. Id. at 1123.
133. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff was a securities broker-dealer,
attempting to lead a class action suit against the defendant. Id. at 1331-32. The
plaintiff alleged that the bonds issued by the defendants were, in fact, illegally issued
under Oklahoma law. Id. at 1331. The plaintiff alleged that the offering circular was
misleading and that the bond opinion was issued "recklessly" by the bond counsel. Id.
at 1331-32. The defendants were also accused of improperly using the funds, and
even more seriously, that they had no initial intention to use the funds raised by the
offering for the activity described in the offering circular. See id. The bonds in
question, similar to those in Shores, were created to provide financing for the
establishment of an industrial facility. Id. at 1331. Also, as in Shores, the bonds in TJ.
Raney defaulted. Id. at 1332. The defendants sought to decertify the plaintiffs' class
because only a portion of the class members read the disclosure documents. Id.
134. Id. at 1333.
135. Id.
136. In re Fort Cobb, Okla., Irr. Fuel Auth., 468 F. Supp. 338, 343 (W.D. Okla.
1979). The court ruled that the Authority had failed to establish "an authorized or
proper function of the beneficiary," providing benefits to non-beneficiaries, and that
the trust had been improperly accepted. Id. at 342-43.
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the defendants were therefore not legally able to market securities
under Oklahoma law. 37
The court, however, was cautious in following Shores, noting that
the earlier decision did not intend to "'establish a scheme of investors'
insurance,"'" which would guarantee a cause of action for any
investor in any security. Rather, T.J. Raney limited the scope of the
Shores holding to new securities illegally issued 3 9  The court
established the "legally unmarketable" category of the fraud-created-
the-market theory, which applies to cases in which a defendant had no
legal authority to issue the securities because he or she bypassed
procedural requirements necessary to issue valid securities." T.J.
Raney focused on investors' ability to rely on the market to provide
the minimum assurance that securities are "qualified legally to be
issued," meaning that investors may assume that an issuer complied
with a regulatory or legislative body's procedures in bringing a
security to market, such as creating the appropriate corporate form or
public trust.'4 ' While other cases have discussed the validity of legal
unmarketability, no other circuit has accepted it.24
The district courts in this circuit continued to refine the fraud-
created-the-market theory.'43 In Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., the District
137. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333 (relying on In re Fort Cobb, 468 F. Supp. at 343;
see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 176 (1994).
138. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
463 (2d Cir. 1965)); see Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The court in T. Raney also reaffirmed that no regulatory body (e.g. the SEC)
reviews the value of a security prior to its issuance or ascertains the truthfulness of
statements made in an offering document. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333. The SEC
requires that all offering documents disclose that the SEC "has [not] approved or
disapproved of the disclosures in the securities or passed upon the accuracy or
adequacy of the prospectus and that any contrary representation is a criminal
offense." 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(b)(7) (2000).
139. See T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333. Other circuits have termed "illegally issued
securities" as "legally unmarketable." See, eg., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27
F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994). This is distinct from "economic unmarketability." Id.
140. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
141. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333.
142. See, e.g., Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160-61 & n.8. Some have commented that
legal unmarketability as adopted by the Tenth Circuit is too closely related to the
Ninth Circuit's highly criticized presumption of reliance on the regulatory process to
be a valid theory of presumption. See infra Part II.A.5; Herzog, supra note 79, at 381-
82. -
143. See Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Colo.
1996). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made material misrepresentations,
including those regarding various financial forecasts and economic difficulties the
project was facing. Id. at 1418. The court found that the plaintiffs could not be
granted a presumption of reliance because they failed to properly claim that the
securities "'could not have been marketed at any price,"' which is required for the
fraud-created-the-market theory. Id (quoting plaintiff's brief). Additionally, in
Arena Land & Investment Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Utah 1994), affd, 69
F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995), the district court ruled that the plaintiffs could not make use
of the fraud-created-the-market theory because their pleadings fell short of the
required particularity. Id at 1480-82.
2001] 2629
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Court of Colorado found that the plaintiff's case failed to meet the
requirements of the fraud-created-the-market theory.'44 The court
reiterated that because of government regulations controlling the
securities issuance process, investors should be allowed at least a bare
presumption of reliance that the securities were issued legally and in
this case, while the defendants had made misrepresentations, their
statements did not affect the legal authority of the issuer to sell the
bonds. 145  While it followed the circuit's approach of legal
unmarketability as established in TJ. Raney, the district court did
implicitly indicate a willingness to consider economic unmarketability
as a viable method. 46
Recently, the Tenth Circuit expanded the scope of the fraud-
created-the-market theory from a simple legal unmarketability
requirement. 147  In Joseph v. Wiles, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's denial of the plaintiff's claim because the plaintiff
failed to meet the standard of unmarketability for the fraud-created-
the-market theory. 48 The court performed a detailed analysis of
whether the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of either
economic or legal unmarketability, clarifying that "[t]here is a
significant difference between securities which should not be
marketed because they involve fraud," meaning economic
unmarketability, "and securities which cannot be marketed because
the issuers lack legal authority to offer them," or legal
unmarketability.' 49  The court found that while the defendant
perpetrated a fraud by misrepresenting the finances of a distressed
entity, the company was not worthless and thus not economically
144. 840 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1993). The Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public
Building Authority issued bonds in 1986 and 1988 to finance the further development
and improvement of a subdivision in Colorado Springs. Id. at 803. Less than one year
after the plaintiffs purchased the bonds, the bond trustee announced a technical
default. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' fraud caused their investment
decision. Id. The complaint generally claimed that the defendants misrepresented
information regarding the financial condition of the project underlying the bonds,
failed to disclose that there were violations of bond covenants, and ignored the
project's trustees' concerns. Id. at 803-04.
145. Id. at 805 (citing T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333).
146. Id. at 805-06 (discussing fraud that is "so egregious" that there would be no
market for the security).
147. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). MiniScribe Corporation, a
disk drive producer, publicly issued almost one hundred million dollars of convertible
debentures in 1987. Id. at 1157. A debenture is a "general debt obligation backed
only by the integrity of the borrower." Downes & Goodman, supra note 29, at 99. A
convertible security is "exchangeable for a set number of another form [of securities]
(usually common shares) at a pre-stated price." Id. at 86. In March of 1989,
MiniScribe disclosed that its financial statements were unreliable. Joseph, 223 F.3d at
1157. Six months later, "widespread intentional fraud" was revealed, which had
caused a significant over-inflation of the company's financial success. Id. Finally in
1990, MiniScribe filed for bankruptcy. Id.
148. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1164-65.
149. Id. at 1165.
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unmarketable. 0 It noted that the bonds did not meet either of the
two interpretations of economic unmarketability being applied in the
federal courts. 51 The court first applied the rigid view of "patently
worthless," which requires that the securities have absolutely no
underlying assets. 52 Because the plaintiff received $8,147 for his
securities, 53 he was unable to claim that the bonds in question were
"patently worthless" as defined by the strict standard. 54 Next, the
court attempted to apply the Abell court's more flexible view of
"patently worthless," allowing for a minimal amount of assets
supporting the entity.155 The plaintiff failed to meet this requirement
as well.1 56  While the court analyzed the applicability of both
definitions of economic unmarketability, however, it did not establish
a clear standard.
Further, the plaintiff in Joseph did not allege that "the debentures
were issued without lawful authority," so the court stated that it could
not grant a presumption of reliance based upon legal
unmarketability.157 The court noted that for a security to meet the
legal unmarketability standard it must be issued by an entity that has
not been granted the legal authority to do so from the appropriate
governmental body and thus does not have the power to issue the
securities. The plaintiffs, however, failed to allege a claim based upon
legal unmarketability.1 15
Joseph upheld legal unmarketability as defined previously in TJ.
Raney 5' and discussed economic unmarketability without deciding on
the proper definition.160 The court stated that it could not presume
reliance for the plaintiff "[b]ecause he has not alleged that his
debentures were economically or legally unmarketable." '61 While the
securities were overvalued because of the defendant's
misrepresentations in the financial statements, they were, in fact,
150. Id. at 1164.
151. Id. at 1164 & n.3.
152. Id. at 1164. The Sixth Circuit in Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151
(6th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit in Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th
Cir. 1989), and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Bexar County Health
Facility Development Corp. Securities Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1990) were
the main proponents of this interpretation of "patently worthless." For further
discussion, see infra Parts II.B.1, II.A.3 and II.A.4, respectively.
153. The plaintiff lost approximately $17,000 on his investment. Joseph, 223 F.3d at
1157, 1164.
154. Id. at 1164.
155. Id. (quoting Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
156. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1164.
157. Id. at 1164-65.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1165; see T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irr. Fuel Auth.,
717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983).
160. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1164-65.
161. Id. at 1165.
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marketable. The language of Joseph, as noted above, signals the
Tenth Circuit's possible willingness to broaden the fraud-created-the-
market theory from solely legally unmarketable securities to
situations involving economic unmarketability. 162
3. The Eleventh Circuit
While the Eleventh Circuit 163 first discussed the validity of the
fraud-created-the-market theory in dicta in 1984 and 1987,164 it did not
directly decide upon its legitimacy until 1989, in Ross v. Bank South,
N.A. 165  In Ross, the court held that the fraud-created-the-market
theory was meant to require plaintiffs to satisfy a "high threshold,',
166
because it only applies to "securities that are so tainted by fraud as to
be totally unmarketable.' ' 67 The plaintiffs failed to meet what the
court saw as Shores' narrow requirements for presuming reliance
162. Id.
163. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was created out
of the Fifth Circuit by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1995 (1981). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that as of September 30, 1981,
Fifth Circuit decisions, such as Shores, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
164. The first case was Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiffs in Lipton claimed that the defendants had publicly released information
intentionally misrepresenting income when in fact the company had suffered a net
loss. Id. at 741. The circuit court affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendant's
motion to dismiss. Id. at 748. The court noted and agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Shores that the presumption of reliance should be narrowly applied to
securities that would have been unmarketable if not for the fraud in situations
involving newly-issued securities. See id. at 746-47. The Lipton court was more
concerned with the general theory of fraud-on-the-market that it found implicit in
Shores, because this case was decided prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Basic
Inc., and additionally, this was a situation involving newly-issued securities. Id. at 747.
Three years later, in Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir.
1987), the court focused on applying the holding in Shores to the specific question of
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Id. at 721-23.
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants made misrepresentations in the prospectus about
the company's distressed economic condition. Id. at 720. The defendants claimed that
there were "individual questions of reliance on the part of the particular purchasers."
Id. at 721. The court held that a presumption of reliance was ideally applicable to
class action cases because all investors relied on the market. Id. at 723; see supra text
accompanying notes 79-81. The presumption of reliance eliminates the problem that
some members of a class may have relied on certain misrepresentations while other
members did not. Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at 723; see supra text accompanying notes 79-
81.
165. 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The plaintiff in this case purchased
First Mortgage Residential Facilities Revenue Bonds ("Revenue Bonds") issued by
the Special Care Facilities Financing Authority of the City of Vestavia Hills. Id. at
725. The Revenue Bonds were sold to finance the building of a facility for the elderly
in Alabama. Id. at 725-26. According to the issuing documents, the repayments of the
Revenue Bonds were absolutely dependent on the sales of residential units in the
facility. Id. at 727. There were insufficient sales and the Revenue Bonds defaulted
after the project filed for bankruptcy. Id.
166. Id. at 732.
167. Id. at 729.
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because the securities were not unmarketable." The Eleventh
Circuit viewed Shores as establishing that the plaintiff must prove that
the defendants intended to publicly issue securities that otherwise
could not be issued.169 The court used as its benchmark an even
stricter measure of economic unmarketability than the Fifth Circuit
did in Abell to determine if it would allow a presumption of
reliance. 170 It stated that the "fraud must be so pervasive that it goes
to the very existence of the bonds."'' The plaintiffs in Ross did not
sufficiently establish that the defendants' fraud rendered the revenue
bonds in question unmarketable at the original price," or even at any
price.173
Ross' narrow interpretation of Shores typifies the federal circuits'
disagreement over the appropriate application and validity of the
theory. 74 The majority in Ross warned against a broad application of
the fraud-created-the-market theory, noting that "plaintiffs must
overcome what the Shores court intended to be a high threshold."'"
One of the concurring opinions in Ross, while agreeing with the case's
result, stated that the court should expressly reject the fraud-created-
the-market theory because the doctrine is "fundamentally flawed and
should be overruled. 1 76  Conversely, two of the dissenting opinions
affirmed the validity of the theory because they found Shores to
persuasively argue that the fraud-created-the-market theory is a valid
method of shielding investors from fraudulent securities and
168. Id. at 729-30; supra text accompanying note 96.
169. Ross, 885 F.2d at 729-30 (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469-70 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
170. Id. at 729.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 731 n.16. It is interesting that the court did not use the reasoning later
employed by the Sixth Circuit in Ockernan v. May Zinia & Co., 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir.
1994). See infra Part II.B.1. In the present case, as in Ockernan, the investors
received some return of their original investment through the bankruptcy
proceedings. See Ockernzan, 27 F.3d at 1153; Ross, 885 F.2d at 727 & n.5. The
Ockernan court rejected the possibility that the securities in that case were
economically unmarketable, based in part on the fact that the securities had some
minimal value because the project, after filing for bankruptcy, was sold for a
significant loss and investors recouped a small portion of their investment. See
Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1153, 1160; see also In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 602, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (reasoning that the plaintiffs
were scheduled to receive at least a partial return on investment through the
bankruptcy plan).
173. Ross, 885 F.2d at 731 n.16.
174. This was a cautious opinion, with two concurring opinions representing four
judges and four separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 723.
175. Ross, 885 F.2d at 732.
176. Id. at 733, 739-44 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (disagreeing with the
majority on the issue of fraud-created-the-market, stating that while the plaintiffs had
met the burden of proof required by Shores, it should be overruled).
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furthering the Exchange Act's purpose of "free and honest securities
markets.
177
In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit, in Shores v. Sklar ("Shores I"), re-
examined the validity of the fraud-created-the-market theory with
regard to its particular application to class action cases brought under
Rule 10b-5. 178 The court affirmed its holding in Kirkpatrick that the
fraud-created-the-market theory is particularly appropriate in class
actions, stating that "the distinction between purchasers relying on the
circular and purchasers not so relying was immaterial.1 79
4. The Third Circuit
The District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania recognized the
potential validity of the fraud-created-the-market theory in three
cases it decided within a three-year period. Beginning in 1989, the
court held in Stinson v. Van Valley Development Corp. 8° that the
plaintiffs could not allege a presumption of reliance because the
securities were not patently worthless. 81 While the court did not
expressly accept the fraud-created-the-market theory, its language
implied a general acceptance of the theory if the securities in question
were patently worthless."8  In discussing the plaintiffs' claim of a
presumption of reliance based on the fraud-created-the-market
theory, the court expressly stated that the theory was not applicable to
the case before it, but it also did not reject the theory.8 3 The court did
state that the case at hand was not "the kind of sham or hoax
warranting application of the fraud-created-the-market
177. Id. at 747-49 (Clark, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority only on a
single aspect of its decision, specifically that the defendants had no reason to think
that their securities were probably heading for default, and agreeing with the
underlying rationale of the Shores decision); id. at 746-47 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the presumption of reliance created by Shores, but stating that the
present facts did not allow for the grant of summary judgment to the defendants). It
is worth noting that both Judge Johnson and Judge Clark stated that the question of
whether a security was unmarketable is a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of
law for the judge. Id. at 746-47 (Johnson, J., dissenting); id. at 747 (Clark, J.,
dissenting); see also id. (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judges Johnson and
Clark that the case presented a "disputed issue of material fact").
178. 844 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit had been previously
split into the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits. Supra note 163.
179. Shores II, 844 F.2d at 1493; supra note 164.
180. 714 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 897 F.2d 524 (1990) (decision without
published opinion). The plaintiffs purchased municipal revenue bonds issued for the
purpose of building a retirement center, which subsequently defaulted on its payment.
Id. at 133-34. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the offering documents
intentionally did not contain information regarding the lack of necessary working
capital to finance the project, and that the defendants made fraudulent promises that
they would support the endeavor. Id. at 134.
181. Id. at 138.
182. See id. at 137-38.
183. Id. at 138.
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presumption."'" The court's language of "warranting application of
the fraud-created-the-market presumption" implies that if the
appropriate facts were before the court, it would formally adopt the
fraud-created-the-market theory. -
The following year, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania produced a
similar result in In re Bexar County Health Facility Development Corp.
Securities Litigation. 6 Again, the court found that the facts before it
did not warrant the application of the theory." The court held that a
plaintiff must prove that the security in question "could not have been
marketed at any... price" in order to be granted a presumption of
reliance under the fraud-created-the-market theory."M The court
relied on the Ross court's approach to economic unmarketability,
noting that Ross required the plaintiff to prove that the security was
inherently worthless.Y9 The court's conclusion strongly suggests that
it did not reject the overall validity of the theoryY"
For the third time in three years, the same district court addressed
this issue in Gruber v. Price Waterhouse.'Y' The court held that the
plaintiffs did not meet the reliance requirement of a private securities
fraud action under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act because they were
unable to sustain the claim that the defendants' fraud created that
particular security's market.Y This decision, however, was also not an
express rejection of the theory and, as in the earlier Eastern District
cases, it contained language implying that, given the proper facts, the
court would apply the theory.193 The language used in all three
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 130 F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (deciding that because the project underlying
the bonds, despite being bankrupt, had some value and would return at least a
minimal amount to its investors, the plaintiffs could not use the fraud-created-the-
market theory because the securities were not patently worthless or a complete
sham).
187. Id. at 611.
188. Id. The plaintiffs had alleged that the disclosure documents did not contain
information regarding the two previous failed attempts to raise financing capital by
the issuer for other projects. Id. at 604.
189. Id. at 609.
190. Id. at 611. The court even went so far as to note the Third Circuit's affirmation
of Stinson. Id. at 610; see supra note 180.
191. 776 F. Supp. 1044 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The plaintiffs sued the accounting firm that
audited the financial statements of the company whose stock the plaintiffs had
purchased. Id. at 1045-46. The plaintiffs claimed that fraudulent audits performed by
the defendant produced intentionally misstated financial statements. Id.
192. Id. at 1053-54. The plaintiffs had also put forth theories of reliance based
upon actual reliance, the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance, and the fraud-on-the-
market theory presumption of reliance. Id. at 1047, 1049; see supra Parts I.B.1, 1.B.2.
The court held that they failed to establish reliance under any of these claims. Gruber,
776 F. Supp. at 1049, 1051-52.
193. See Gruber, 776 F. Supp. at 1052-53. (using such language as -[t]herefore,
'fraud-created-the-market' only applies where the underlying business is an absolute
sham, worthless from the beginning" and "[iln this instance, it would be inappropriate
to presume reliance under the 'fraud-created-the-market doctrine').
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania cases, however, appears to be in
agreement with the Eleventh Circuit's view of strict interpretation of
economic unmarketability.' 94
5. The Ninth Circuit: Reliance on the Regulatory Body
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a somewhat unusual
argument in Arthur Young & Co. v. District Court9 a few years
before the emergence of the fraud-created-the-market theory in
Shores. The petitioners were defendants in the district court
proceeding and had requested the de-certification of the plaintiffs'
class. 196 The plaintiffs claimed the defendant made a variety of
material misrepresentations in numerous disclosure documents and
offering statements regarding the sale and multiple subsequent
transfers of shares in oil and gas exploration entities. 97 The court,
relying on its earlier decision in Blackie v. Barrack,98 held that an
initial investor of securities "relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity
of the regulatory process and the truth of any representations made to
the appropriate agencies.., at the time of the original issue."' 99 As
with legal and economic unmarketability standards, the court
recognized that but for the defendant's fraud, the securities could and
would not have been issued. Under "reliance on the regulatory body"
the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a presumption of reliance based on
the registration of a new security with a regulatory body, usually theSEC.2°°
This variation on a presumption of reliance has not been well
received by other courts.2°' Critics' primary concern is that regulatory
bodies, particularly the SEC, do not perform any type of evaluation or
due diligence on a securities offering when it is registered.2" While an
investor may not rely on a regulatory body to guarantee an issuer's
disclosures, he or she may assume that such statements are
194. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
195. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977).
196. Id. at 687-88.
197. Id. at 688-89.
198. 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (removing the substantial burden of proving
reliance when it involves publicly traded securities).
199. Arthur Young, 549 F.2d at 695.
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 251 & n.2 (1988) (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2000)(noting the court's concern that this would create investors' insurance).
202. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1165-66; Snow, supra note 54, at 947 (stating that "because
regulators do not pass on the appropriateness of an IPO offering price, or on legal
sufficiency of disclosures in a prospectus, the analytical underpinning for the Arthur
Young presumption-the existence of a regulatory process capable of making these
determinations-would appear to be absent"); supra note 138 (detailing the
disclosure required by the SEC regarding the absence of any qualitative review of
offering documents); see Herzog, supra note 79, at 381.
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trustworthy. The Tenth Circuit commented that to presume that the
issuance of securities guarantees a minimal level of value contravenes
the idea that registration of securities with regulatory bodies is an
enforcement of disclosure requirements, not a guarantee of
reliability.2°3 The Ninth Circuit contended, however, that investors
are able to rely on the issuing process as a minimal guarantee of
marketability.'
Critics also contend that the Ninth Circuit's approach is remarkably
similar to legal unmarketability, and thus, creates the same problems
attributed to the fraud-created-the-market theory.21 While the theory
is rooted in the same concepts as the fraud-created-the-market theory,
the difference lies in that the Arthur Young presumption of reliance
focuses on the fraudulent "representations made to the appropriate
agencies and the investors,"2"6 which resulted in the security being
issued. In contrast, the legal unmarketability standard, as set out by
the Tenth Circuit in T.J. Raney, focuses on whether the issuing entity
deliberately bypassed certain steps in the regulatory process of issuing
securities.'
A plaintiff attempting to use the Arthur Young presumption is
relying on a regulatory body, primarily the SEC, as evidence of an
offering circular's veracity, but the Tenth Circuit in T.J. Raney was not
concerned with a plaintiff's reliance on statements made to any
regulatory bodies. In the Ninth Circuit, the presumption rests upon
the theory that the SEC has in some way given credence to the
accuracy of a company's statements, on which the plaintiffs may
therefore rely. Legal unmarketability, by contrast, claims that the
company, as the issuing entity, simply had no legal right to issue the
securities, regardless of what statements it made to the SEC.
B. Circuits Refuting Fraud-Created-the-Market
While a number of circuits have either expressly or implicitly
accepted the fraud-created-the-market theory, the Sixth and the
Seventh Circuits have questioned aspects of the fraud-created-the-
market theory as contrary to a policy of full disclosure to investors.
Yet even these circuits do not completely reject the fraud-created-the-
market theory, and their resistance to the theory appears to be based
on a misunderstanding of the theory rather than a rejection of
principles underlying it.
203. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1156-66.
204. Arthur Young, 549 F.2d at 695.
205. E.g., Herzog, supra note 79, at 393-94.
206. Arthur Young, 549 F.2d at 695.
207. Supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. In legal unmarketability, the only
misrepresentation an issuer makes is the implicit representation that because the
securities are in the market, they were issued according to the proper regulatory
procedures. See Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1165-66.
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1. The Sixth Circuit
In Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath,°8 the Sixth Circuit was faced
with deciding the validity of the fraud-on-the-market theory as
applied to inefficient primary markets.2 9  The court held that the
presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory in
Basic Inc. only applies to efficient markets because a defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentations will only be incorporated into the
market price in an efficient market."' 0 The market for certain newly-
issued securities such as tax-exempt municipal bonds, on the other
hand, is inherently inefficient because the market has not yet
evaluated the bond's worth, but reflects only the issuer's pricing of the
securities.211 While this appears to directly refute the Shores holding,
which appeared to extend the fraud-on-the-market theory to the
primary markets, the court expressly chose not to reject the fraud-
created-the-market theory.12 After reviewing the history of the
fraud-created-the-market theory, the Freeman court declared that it
"is separate and distinct from the fraud on the market theory, and is
supported by an entirely different rationale. 2 13
While the majority chose not to address the fraud-created-the-
market theory, Judge Guy stated in a separate opinion that the lower
court was in fact asking this court to decide the status of the theory in
the Sixth Circuit.1 4 His opinion stated that "I would join with the
courts that have recognized" the fraud-created-the-market theory as a
valid presumption of reliance.1 5
208. 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff class represented all investors of the
tax-exempt municipal bonds issued to raise the necessary capital to build a retirement
center in Kentucky. Id. at 196. The plaintiffs claimed that there were numerous
fraudulent statements in the prospectus regarding the project's lack of financial
viability. Id. The project filed for bankruptcy after only seven of the 175 residential
units were sold. Id. The bankruptcy plan provided for the investors to receive an
estimated fifty-five percent of their initial invested capital. Id. Because the
bondholders were set to recover a significant portion of their money, the court could
have followed the lead of Ockerman and decided that this alone was sufficient to
prevent the plaintiff from meeting the economic unmarketability standard. See supra
note 152 and accompanying text; infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text;
Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1412, 1418-19 (D. Colo. 1996).
209. Freeman, 915 F.2d at 197; see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text for
discussion of efficient markets.
210. Freeman, 915 F.2d at 197-98.
211. Id. While issuers generally set the issuing price of a new stock in the fifteen to
twenty-five dollars per share range, they will often also consider anticipated investor
interest in the security. If the issue is going to be a "hot issue," the issuer will fix the
original price somewhat higher, at a premium. Conversely, if there is little market
interest in the security, the issuing price may be set lower than normal at a discount.
Thus, while the issuer has complete control over the original price, the market does
have influence over the pricing.
212. Id. at 199.
213. Id. at 200.
214. Id. at 200-01 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 200 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Four years later, this presumption of reliance was directly at issue
before the Sixth Circuit in Ockerman v. May Zima & Co.2  The
circuit court overturned the district court's grant of a presumption of
reliance to the plaintiff under the fraud-created-the-market theory in
a primary issue.2 17 Its analysis began with affirming the Freeman
court's rejection of the fraud-on-the-market theory for certain types of
securities, specifically initial offerings of municipal bonds.21  The
Ockerman court further discussed that the fraud-created-the-market
theory conflicted with the holding in Freeman, despite the Freeman
court's express avoidance of ruling on the fraud-created-the-market
theory.2 9 The court appeared to misapply economic unmarketability,
however, by stating that its main difficulty with accepting the theory
was that the market does not control the price of a newly-issued
security and that all available public information is not incorporated
into the price.' These factors are irrelevant both to "economic
unmarketability" in particular, and to the fraud-created-the-market
theory in general?' The court proceeded to recognize other circuits'
application of the fraud-created-the-market theory if a security could
not have been marketed "but for the defendant's fraud" and if there
was reliance on the market.'
The Sixth Circuit also refuted the district court's reasoning that
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) themselves create a presumption of reliance
because it was concerned that this completely removed reliance as a
prerequisite to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) causes of action.' The court
216. 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs purchased mortgage revenue bonds
issued by the city of Bowling Green, Kentucky, which were issued to fimance the
construction of a retirement facility. Id. at 1153. As in Freeman, here the plaintiffs
alleged that the offering documents contained a number of misrepresentations of the
financial situation supporting the project and the defendants themselves. Id. at 1153-
54. Again similar to the facts in Freeman, this project failed because of a lack of a
market for the housing units. Id at 1154; see also Freeman, 915 F.2d at 196. Only
approximately $485,000 was paid back to the investors through the bankruptcy plan
out of a combined initial investment of $5.5 million. Ockernan, 27 F.3d at 1153.
217. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1158 (noting that the lower court held that Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act was intended to give the plaintiff a presumption of reliance on the
"integrity of the defendants' scheme and course of business in issuing the securities in
question" (quoting Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 785 F. Supp. 695, 703 (M.D. Tenn.
1992))).
218. Id at 1158-59 (citing Freeman, 915 F.2d at 193, 198). For a definition of
municipal bonds, see supra note 97.
219. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1159; see also supra note 212 and accompanying text.
220. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1159.
221. Complete assimilation of information into a security's market, however, is one
of the basic foundations of the fraud-on-the-market theory, not the fraud-created-the-
market theory. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
222. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1159 (citing Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723
(11th Cir. 1989) (en banc)); TJ. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb Okla. Irr. Fuel
Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Shores v. Sklar. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
223. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161-62. Direct reliance is still required in Rule 10b-
5(b) causes of action. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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expressed its view that such an interpretation would create the
infamous "investor's insurance" by essentially guaranteeing an
investor recovery. 24 It relied on Justice White's dissent in Basic Inc.,
who was troubled that such a presumption of reliance would
"'permit[] recovery by a plaintiff who claims merely to have been
harmed by a material misrepresentation which altered a market
price.""'2  Justice White, however, was concerned with a "material
misrepresentation which altered a market price, "'2 6 while the crucial
focus of the fraud-created-the-market theory is not securities that
have intentionally altered market prices, but securities with a
completely fraudulent market price. The fraud-on-the-market theory
presumes reliance in situations of intentionally mispriced securities,
while the fraud-created-the-market theory presumes reliance in
situations where securities are intentionally fraudulently marketed.227
The Ockerman court further discussed the problem of establishing a
clear definition of "unmarketable." ' It noted, as other courts have,229
that unmarketability can be both economic and legal." It provided a
clear description of economic unmarketability, focusing on the
concept of an enterprise with no assets to support it, following the
Eleventh Circuit and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1  In
Ockerman, the Sixth Circuit chose, however, to avoid adjudicating
whether this specific presumption of reliance applied to newly-issued
securities. 2 Although the plaintiffs failed to claim that the bonds
were patently worthless, the court sua sponte rejected that
possibility. 3 Despite the bankruptcy of the entity, some of its assets
were sold and the bondholders recovered minimal amounts of their
investment. 4
The court chose not to address the legal unmarketability of the
securities because the plaintiffs also failed to allege the issue in their
claim."3 Accordingly, the court concluded by stating, "we neither
adopt nor reject that theory since to do so would be advisory....
[T]herefore, [we hold] that a presumption of reliance based on a fraud
created the market theory of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits is
224. Id. at 1162.
225. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 251 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting)) (emphasis omitted).
226. Id. (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 251 (White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
added).
227. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000).
228. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
229. See, e.g.,Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1165.
230. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
231. See id.; supra notes 170-73, 189 and accompanying text.
232. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1153.
235. Id. at 1160-61.
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unavailable to plaintiff in this case."'  It appears that, despite its
earlier language in Freeman, the circuit's position on the theory is not
yet fully developed.
2. The Seventh Circuit
Subsequent to Freeman, but prior to Ockerman, the Seventh Circuit
was presented with a claim of a presumption of reliance on the fraud-
created-the-market theory in Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors."- The
court first acknowledged the current disagreement between the
circuits.3 It concluded that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Freeman
was the appropriate stance on this presumption of reliance.- -  The
court repudiated the Fifth Circuit's decision in Shores, describing it as
"simply false."2' The court's primary dispute with Shores was that a
private plaintiff relying solely on the issuance of a particular security is
not the same as an investor relying on information disclosed in a
prospectus.241 The court in Eckstein noted that inadequate disclosures
do not by themselves prevent a security's issuance. -2 In what appears
to be confusion with the fraud-on-the-market theory, it stated that the
market transacts in numerous securities despite improper disclosure
by the issuers of those securities.243 The court went on to state that
"[f]ull disclosure of adverse information may lower the price, but it
does not exclude the security from the market." 2' The court focused
on fraudulently mispriced securities, not patently worthless securities
that should not be on the market because they represent a completely
bogus entity.245
While the Eckstein court did not specifically discuss economic
unmarketability, it commented on legal unmarketability at least
236. Id at 1161.
237. 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993). Eckstein is a complex securities case involving two
classes of plaintiffs, the Majeski plaintiffs and the Eckstein plaintiffs, ML at 1123. The
Majeski plaintiffs were purchasers of partnership interests who had relied on the
prospectuses, while the Eckstein plaintiffs were investors who had not relied on the
prospectus. The defendants, the issuers of the partnership interests, failed to raise the
required minimum capital of fifty million dollars and reduced that amount to thirty-
five million. After two years of operations, the defendant informed investors of the
likelihood of a partial capital loss. The relevant class for the fraud-created-the-
market theory is the Eckstein plaintiffs, who alleged, among other things, that -but
for the misrepresentations and omissions the offering would not have been
successful." Id. At least one critic of the theory cites Eckstein as a clear rejection of it.
Herzog, supra note 79, at 383-86.
238. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130.
239. Id.; see supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
240. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
241. Id.
242. Id at 1130.
243. Id at 1130-31.
244. Id. at 1131.
245. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
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indirectly.246 The court noted that if the plaintiffs had proved that
absent the fraud the defendants could not have met the minimum
investment capital amount, then the defendants could not have legally
issued the partnership interests.47 With this statement, the court
appeared to be agreeing with the "unlawfully issued" standard of the
Tenth Circuit in T.J. Raney,2 4 but the Eckstein plaintiffs failed to
prove such an allegation.249
The Eckstein court's opinion symbolized the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits position on the fraud-created-the-market theory. While the
circuits ostensibly rejected the theory, their opinions indicated both a
misapplication of the theory and a willingness to consider its validity
in certain situations, such as in the fraudulent issuance of patently
worthless securities. In contrast, the circuits expressly accepting the
fraud-created-the-market theory have established that it may be
applied in situations where a security is either economically or legally
unmarketable." While the Tenth Circuit in TJ. Raney was the only
circuit to primarily focus on legal unmarketability, two versions of
economic unmarketability developed in the Eleventh and Third
Circuits, and the Fifth Circuit."
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit's more flexible standard of
patently worthless securities provides the proper view of economic
unmarketability. That standard and the Tenth Circuit's standard of
legal unmarketability are the appropriate methods for courts to apply
the fraud-created-the-market theory, as the next part will discuss.
This presumption of reliance is necessary considering the original
intent of the Acts to have honest and fair markets, combined with the
continual proliferation of fraudulent securities issues in traditional
markets and the emergence of the Internet as a securities market.
III. THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET THEORY IS A VALID
PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE
The fraud-created-the-market theory is still a work in progress. The
courts are continuing to clarify not only the validity of the theory, but
how and when it is to be properly applied. 2 Opponents of the theory
246. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
247. Id.
248. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
249. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
250. Supra Part II.A.
251. Supra Parts II.A.1-A.4.
252. Not all of the circuits have taken an express position on the validity of the
fraud-created-the-market theory. For example, the Eighth Circuit, in In re
NationsMart Corp., 130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997), failed to answer the question of the
fraud-created-the-market theory's validity. Plaintiffs, purchasers of NationsMart
stock, alleged, among other things, that the defendants made material omissions and
false statements in the prospectus. Id. at 314. The court held that the plaintiffs could
not presume reliance because they failed to properly allege sufficient facts to support
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assert that any application of the fraud-created-the-market theory is
unacceptable because it violates the statutory purpose of the Acts by
de-emphasizing the importance of disclosure in market regulation. 23
According to these critics, the Acts were passed with the express
purpose of using disclosure to create a system of self-regulation.'
The overall goal of the Acts is contravened if private plaintiffs are
relieved of their burden of proving direct reliance on either disclosure
or lack of disclosure, for it will create unconcerned and passive
investors who will stop reading prospectuses and other disclosure
documents to determine an investment's value. The critics most
greatly fear that this theory would virtually guarantee any investor
recovery for a failed investment, which would open the floodgates tolitigation."s
Yet these critics fail to realize that when properly applied, as in
Abell"6 and Joseph.-' the fraud-created-the-market theory directly
flows from the purpose of the Exchange Act, which is to create and
maintain an honest and fair securities market." By itself, disclosure is
an insufficient regulatory structure because investors cannot
completely analyze all of the information in the marketplace, and thus
they can not properly evaluate potential investment opportunities.
Finally, the fraud-created-the-market theory is necessary because of
the growing number of unmarketable securities, especially patently
worthless ones, that are now being offered over the Internet in
addition to the conventional markets.
The fraud-created-the-market theory should be applied in situations
where it would not only be unduly burdensome but also irrelevant for
a plaintiff to establish his or her actual reliance on a defendant's false
statements. Courts have balanced granting such a presumption of
reliance with the significant burden of proving a defendant's intent to
defraud in order to prevent abuse by plaintiffs of the theory."'
Private plaintiffs need to be granted this presumption of reliance
whenever an entity has no intention to have its security represent an
investment in a legitimate and potentially viable enterprise or in an
enterprise with the legal authority to issue that security.
application of the fraud-created-the-market theory. Id. at 322. The court did not use
language that strongly implied it would accept such a theory, but neither did it use
language implicitly rejecting it. Id. at 321-22.
253. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J.,
dissenting); Herzog, supra note 79, at 362, 387, 390, 396-98.
254. Shores, 647 F.2d at 472-73 (Randall, J., dissenting); Herzog, supra note 79, at
387, 390,396-98.
255. Shores, 647 F.2d at 472-73 (Randall, J., dissenting); Herzog, supra note 79, at
362.
256. Supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
257. Supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text.
258. Infra Part III.B.1.
259. Infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
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A. Proper Application of the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory
Since the Shores decision, courts have applied several versions of
the fraud-created-the-market theory.2" The Fifth Circuit's approach
to economically unmarketable securities as stated in Abell is the
proper standard to determine whether a security is patently
worthless.26' The court correctly focused on examining the issuer's
intent to decide whether the plaintiff would be granted this
presumption of reliance.262 Courts should determine whether the
purpose of marketing a new security is to provide needed capital to
finance an honest business or simply to perpetrate a complete sham.2 63
If a defendant had no plans to operate an actual enterprise, it does not
matter what, if any, disclosures were made and whether an investor
had relied on them. This is what separates the fraud-created-the-
market theory from the fraud-on-the-market theory. When a party
intentionally alters the market price of a security that is already
trading in the market, the fraud-on-the-market theory grants a
presumption that the market price is accurate. 264 Fraud-created-the-
market, however, grants a presumption of reliance if a party
intentionally issues a security that should not be issued at any price.26 1
The fraudulent intent renders proof of actual reliance unnecessary
because the plaintiff would have suffered a financial injury whether or
not he or she had relied on offering documents and disclosure
statements.
Part of the original intent of the Exchange Act is for courts to be
flexible in adopting Rule 10b-5. The Fifth Circuit correctly adhered to
the doctrine of flexibility, balancing it with the concerns that
overbroad application of the fraud-created-the-market theory could
potentially create the investors' insurance feared by some.266 In
deciding whether a security was patently worthless, Abell implied that
courts should apply a certain amount of flexibility.2 67 The court was
not as strict as other circuits, which require an absolute absence of any
assets underlying the security in order for a plaintiff to allege that the
fraud created the market.268 The court properly recognized that
260. Supra Parts IC, II.A.
261. Supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
262. Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
263. The level of risk involved in an investment is not a factor in determining
whether a plaintiff is eligible for this presumption of reliance. An issuer raising
capital to fund a high-risk venture, such as an Internet start-up company, is not the
type of entity, if it subsequently fails, that a plaintiff could bring a Rule 10b-5 cause of
action against and be granted a presumption of reliance under the fraud-created-the-
market theory because there was no intent to defraud.
264. Supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
265. Supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
266. Infra Part III.B.1.
267. Supra note 129 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., supra notes 170-73, 189 and accompanying text.
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"saleable assets may bless even the most worthless enterprise. '"21 For
example, as noted by the Abell court, the defendants in Shores clearly
intended to defraud investors with unmarketable securities, despite
the presence of some assets in the entity underlying the security.t"
The Eleventh Circuit's stricter, absolute approach to patently
worthless securities as expressed in Ross" does not provide courts the
needed flexibility to apply the fraud-created-the-market theory in
situations where, even if there were minimal assets in an entity,
potential defendants had no intention to operate an economically
marketable business.
The Tenth Circuit in Joseph, clarifying its holding in T.J. Raney,
established the correct standard for examining legal
unmarketability.2 '  The Tenth Circuit's definition of legal
unmarketability created a minimum baseline of reliance that the
issuing corporation had the proper legal authority to offer the
securities, and did not intentionally bypass one of the steps set forth
by regulatory bodies in order to legally issue the securities.' For
example, municipal revenue bonds need to be issued through a
properly formed trust.274 If a defendant had intentionally and
improperly formed the trust, he or she would not have the legal
authority to issue the bonds, even if the project was financially viable.
An investor in this model does not assume that a regulatory agency
has guaranteed the market price of the security, but merely presumes
that the issuer has not fraudulently offered the securities in violation
of regulations.2"5
The fraud-created-the-market theory is particularly appropriate in
allowing a plaintiff a presumption of reliance in a class action under
Rule 10b-5, when it is difficult to prove that the entire class relied on
disclosure documents 7 6  Without such a presumption, a class of
injured investors would either be unable to use the class action forum
to seek a remedy or would be burdened with the task of establishing
direct reliance for each of the many individuals in the class. The
fraud-created-the-market theory is ideal for class actions because of
the efficiency of creating a common presumption of reliance for all
class members.27' Courts have found that it is appropriate to certify
269. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988).
270. Id. (discussing Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane));
see also supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
271. Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729-30 (l1th Cir. 1989). The Third
and Sixth Circuits also apply the same standard. Supra notes 193-94, 231-34 and
accompanying text.
272. Supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
273. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2000).
274. Supra note 136 and accompanying text.
275. Supra note 138.
276. Supra notes 164, 178-79 and accompanying text.
277. Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722-23 (11th Cir. 1987).
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plaintiff classes in fraud-created-the-market cases because the
different levels of actual reliance between individual class members is
either "immaterial" or "virtually irrelevant. 278
Critics of the fraud-created-the-market theory hold that the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Eckstein and the Sixth Circuit's decisions
in Freeman and later in Ockerman properly rejected the fraud-
created-the-market theory's validity. 7 9 These critics, however, have
misread the Freeman decision as a rejection of the theory, and
furthermore, the courts in Ockerman and Eckstein were incorrect in
their dismissal of the fraud-created-the-market theory. In the earliest
of the three cases, the Freeman court expressly stated that it was not
rejecting the fraud-created-the-market theory."8° It made a clear
distinction between the fraud-created-the-market theory and the
fraud-on-the-market theory."' While the court would not presume
reliance in an inefficient secondary market, it did state that the fraud-
created-the-market theory was "supported by an entirely different
rationale."'
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Eckstein clearly relied on
Freeman.83 The Eckstein court interpreted the Sixth Circuit's holding
in Freeman as a complete rejection of this theory, despite the Sixth
Circuit's express avoidance of that very issue.' Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit arguably misapplied the underlying rationale of
Shores. As noted above, it described the "linchpin of Shores" to be
simply that "disclosing bad information keeps securities off the
market." 5  The plaintiffs in Eckstein did not meet the
unmarketability requirements of the theory because they failed to
prove that the partnership interests were issued illegally and failed to
allege that the securities were patently worthless.286  The Eckstein
court, however, did not recognize that Shores and its progeny did not
merely reiterate the importance of full disclosure to the market but,
more importantly, established the fraud-created-the-market theory to
apply to securities that could not have been marketed absent a
defendant's intentional fraud.'
The Seventh Circuit erred in assuming that a party intending to
commit a completely fraudulent offering would be motivated to
disclose this "bad information." While disclosing negative
278. Shores II, 844 F.2d 1485, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988); Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at 723.
279. Herzog, supra note 79, at 383-86; see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d
1121, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1993).
280. Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990).
281. Id. at 200.
282. Id.
283. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130.
284. Id.; supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
285. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131; supra Part II.B.2.
286. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130-31.
287. See supra Parts I.C, II.A.
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information may prevent an artificial increase in the value of a
security traded on the market, it will not prevent the security from
being issued. The court used the underlying principles of the fraud-
on-the-market theory as set forth in Basic Inc.,' and therefore may
have confused the distinction between fraud-on-the-market and fraud-
created-the-market. 289 The court incorrectly focused on manipulated
market prices of securities, not on fraudulent securities that should
never have entered the market.
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit in Ockerman similarly misapplied
the fraud-on-the-market theory to a fraud-created-the-market cause
of action in relying on Justice White's dissent in Basic Inc. regarding a
security's market value being affected by a material
misrepresentation. 290  The fraud-created-the-market theory is not
available for plaintiffs seeking to recover for a loss due to fraudulently
mispriced securities, but rather for a loss due to securities that never
would have been issued but for the defendant's fraud?21g The court
criticized the fraud-created-the-market theory because a security's
issuing price may not accurately represent its value because the issuers
have different motivation than investors. 2  This criticism is
misplaced, however, because the fraud-created-the-market theory is
not concerned with accurate pricing of securities, even in initial
offerings, but with the intentionally fraudulent securities issued at any
293price.
B. The Underlying Rationale of the Fraud-Created-the-Market
Theory
1. Statutory Purpose
Some have stated that the fraud-created-the market theory clashes
with the original intent of the Exchange Act. 4 Critics of the theory
feel that the overriding purpose of the Acts was to encourage full and
fair disclosure by securities issuers, thus creating a level playing field
for investors.295 The dissent in Shores argued that Congress, in passing
288. Supra Part I.B.2.
289. Supra note 82.
290. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1162 (6th Cir. 1994).
291. Supra notes 101, 107-08 and accompanying text.
292. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1159.
293. See id. at 1158-59 (discussing both the fraud-on-the-market and the fraud-
created-the-market theory).
294. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 473-74 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J.,
dissenting).
295. ld. at 482 (Randall, J., dissenting); see also Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161-62;
Herzog, supra note 79, at 390. For an alternative theory on the intended purpose of




the Acts, only intended complete disclosure of accurate
information. 96
Yet the intent of the Exchange Act was not to create a fully
educated and active investor, but rather to maintain the highest level
of integrity in the markets and to ensure investor protection against
fraudulent schemes and devices.29  When the Exchange Act was
proposed, one of its original authors stated that Section 10(b) "was 'a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.' ' 298  As noted
recently by the SEC's Director of Enforcement, Richard H. Walker,
"the antifraud prohibitions have to be expansive in order to address
the evolving world of manipulative schemes. ' 299 The Supreme Court
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores00 held that the Exchange
Act was designed "'to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets.' ' 301 Just a year later, the Court stated
that the Acts' purposes were "to protect investors against fraud
and.., to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." 312
While it is clear that active and educated investors can help maintain a
sound market, full disclosure is just one piece of a comprehensive
policy of market integrity. Investors, particularly individuals, are
not in a position to thoroughly analyze all of the publicly available
information on securities. Most individuals lack the knowledge and
the time to perform a complete analysis of a security's weaknesses,
even if there is no fraud or wrongdoing on the issuer's part.
In order to adhere effectively to the intent of investor protection,
courts must be able to flexibly apply Rule 10b-5 to the types of
scenarios where the security would not and should not have been
issued at all. For at least thirty-five years the Supreme Court has
espoused this "flexible" view. Beginning with its holding in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., ° the Supreme Court stated that
securities legislation was "intended... to be... 'enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but
296. Shores, 647 F.2d at 481-82 (Randall, J., dissenting).
297. John Schmidt, Comment, The Fraud-Created-The-Market Theory: The
Presumption of Reliance in the Primary Issue Context, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 495, 519-20
(1991) (noting that "the [acts'] central goal is to protect investors from fraudulent
conduct, and to promote honest securities markets").
298. Richard H. Walker, Regulation vs. Enforcement in an On-Line World,
Address Before The Bond Market Association's 6th Annual Legal and Compliance
Seminar 3 (Oct. 25, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch413.htm.
299. Id.
300. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
301. Id. at 728 (quoting the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a); see Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that "[t]the statute and rule are designed to
foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud"); see also Shores,
647 F.2d at 470.
302. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
303. Shores, 647 F.2d at 470.
304. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 5 Subsequent to Capital
Gains, the Court and other lower courts have consistently followed its
flexible approach to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. '
Additionally, criticism regarding the intent of the Acts is misplaced
because the fraud-created-the-market theory is consistent with a
policy of full and fair disclosure in the market.' The Acts presume
that the issuers have the burden to provide accurate information,
rather than imposing on the investing public the burden of actively
seeking out possible misrepresentations. The Acts were created to
prevent the circumstances leading to the 1929 stock market crash,
such as companies issuing worthless securities or allowing publicly
traded companies to be managed with reckless disregard for
shareholders' interests.3" Company managers who are tempted to
overstate assets or understate liability to artificially improve the
company's financial results are potentially motivated instead to fully
disclose negative information in order to prevent recrimination from
the SEC as well as potential private causes of action under Rule lOb-
5.309 Parties seeking to perpetrate complete frauds, however, are not
similarly motivated to disclose that their company is patently
worthless because they have decided to risk the potential
repercussions from the SEC or private plaintiffs. Mandatory full
disclosure is irrelevant to such parties because their intent is to make
misrepresentations to the public, attempting to persuade investors to
purchase securities they would otherwise not purchase. In other
words, "[w]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap
game?"31 The fraud-created-the-market theory is necessary because
it supplements a policy of full disclosure by granting a remedy to
victims of the types of fraud that full disclosure would not prevent.
Furthermore, there is growing concern among securities regulators
that a policy of full disclosure combined with modern communication
305. 1l at 195 (notes omitted) (quoting 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 382
(3d ed. 1943)) (comparing the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to other securities
legislation).
306. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728-30 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-12 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Lipton v. Documation Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (11th Cir.
1984) (concluding that the Shores holding further allowed "a purchaser to rely on an
expectation that the securities markets are free from fraud"); TJ. Raney & Sons. Inc.
v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irr. Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974)); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
470 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (noting "the purposes of the securities acts and rule lOb-
5 are far broader than merely providing full disclosure or fostering informed
investment decisions").
307. Schmidt, supra note 297, at 520-21. The courts support this argument. See,
e.g., Shores, 647 F.2d at 470.
308. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
309. Schmidt, supra note 297, at 521.
310. Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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technology may create the dangerous possibility of "too much
information" being released upon the market.3" The SEC is
especially concerned that the Internet is becoming a source of "an
unlimited amount of disclosure" with the potential to overwhelm
investors with information, effectively eliminating the benefits of full
disclosure.312 SEC Commissioner Unger recently questioned whether
all of the available information can be effectively filtered and
interpreted by the average investor so it can be used properly.31 3 A
policy focused only on disclosure, which critics of the fraud-created-
the-market theory support,314 is not the most effective way to promote
fair securities markets, and rigidly adhering to the full disclosure
doctrine is not the solution to securities fraud problems. The fraud-
created-the-market theory is necessary because if the investors are no
longer able to rely on a company's representations, direct reliance
becomes irrelevant. Indeed, "will [investors] be able to distinguish
reliable information from the unreliable or even fraudulent
information? '" 311
2. The Problem of Creating "Investors' Insurance"
Opponents of the doctrine believe it will create a new generation of
passive and potentially negligent investors, because all burdens of
researching a new security will be removed, thus allowing investors to
assume that because a security is on the market, it is an inherently
worthy investment.316 The fraud-created-the-market theory, critics
claim, creates a form of "investors' insurance," in which an investor is
guaranteed against loss in any investment in a primary issue.317 Critics
contend that the theory will grant private plaintiffs unfettered
311. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Securities Law and the Internet, Address
Before the Practicing Law Institute 3 (July 28, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch395.htm [hereinafter Unger, Securities Law]; see
SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age:
Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, Address at the Internet Securities
Regulation American Conference Institute (June 26, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm [hereinafter Unger, Disclosure].
312. Unger, Securities Law, supra note 311, at 2. Last year, according to the SEC,
over half the country had access to the Internet in their homes. Id. The Internet is
growing at an alarming rate. For example, in 1999, "one new web site was being
established every minute and the number of Internet users and web pages doubled
every 100 days." Unger, Disclosure, supra note 311, at 1.
313. Unger, Securities Law, supra note 311, at 2-3.
314. Supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
315. Unger, Disclosure, supra note 311, at 2.
316. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J.,
dissenting); Herzog, supra note 79, at 395-96.
317. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 473, 483 (Randall, J., dissenting); Herzog, supra note
79, at 395-96. The critics' worst case scenario is that every security would have to be a
valid security and increase in value or the investor would have the fraud-created-the-
market theory as a safety net to recover his or her investment.
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opportunities to bring causes of action whenever a security proves to
be unsuccessful. 18
Yet safeguards are built into the fraud-on-the-market theory to
prevent it from becoming "investors' insurance." First, the theory is a
rebuttable presumption of reliance. 19 Courts have clearly stated that
defendants may overcome the plaintiffs presumption of reliance,
forcing the plaintiff to prove actual reliance or fail in his or her cause
of action.320
Second, the requirement of scienter in Rule 10b-5 claimsn' provides
strong protection from the potential dangers of creating investors'
insurance because it is a significant barrier for plaintiffs to
overcome.3 2  The court in Ross commented that the burden of
proving scienter is based on the first of the three requirements the
Shores court established for a plaintiff to bring an action successfully
under the fraud-created-the-market theory. - -' In legal
unmarketability claims a plaintiff must not only establish that a
defendant failed to adhere to a governmental regulation to be
successful, but also that there was a malevolent intent."4 An issuer is
not automatically liable if it made an honest mistake. Similarly, if a
plaintiff claimed that a security was economically unmarketable, the
Fifth Circuit requires that the issuer "knew that the subject enterprise
was worthless when the securities were issued."'
C. The Theory is Necessary Because of the Growth of Internet
Securities Fraud
In the last few years the securities industry has entered the digital
age via the World Wide Web. Issuers can interact with potential
investors via the Internet with an ease and speed previously unheard
of. For example, according to a recent speech by Commissioner
Unger, in the year 2000 there were approximately twelve million
31& Shores, 647 F.2d at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting).
319. This has its roots in the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is also a rebuttable
presumption of reliance. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988). For a
discussion of how a defendant may rebut this presumption, see supra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text.
320. See, eg., In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D.
602, 607-08 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
321. See supra note 48.
322. See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1989); In re
Bexar, 130 F.R.D. at 609.
323. Ross, 885 F.2d at 729. The court in Ross cited that "[uinder Shores, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the
market which were not entitled to be marketed." Id.
324. TJ. Raney & Sons, Inc., v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irr. Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330,
1333 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating "defendants knowingly conspired... with the intent to
defraud").
325. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1988).
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investors trading through on-line brokerage accounts. 32 6  On-line
initial public offerings ("IPOs"), while still a small portion of the total
IPO market, are quickly becoming a viable method to enter the
market.327 Likewise, the bond market is making its presence felt on
the Internet.328 The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation2 9
successfully completed its first bond offer via the Internet, raising
approximately $6 billion, and the Internet is now seeing its first
municipal bond offerings, as evidenced by a $530 million issuance by
the Territory of Puerto Rico.330
The SEC has been adapting its approach in order to keep up with
the rapid evolution of the securities industry. In October of 1995, the
SEC, in a Securities Act Release,331 clearly stated that "[t]he liability
provisions of the federal securities laws apply equally to electronic
and paper-based media. For instance, the anti-fraud provisions of...
Rule 10b-5 ... would apply to any information delivered
electronically.""33  In July of 1996, the SEC granted a No-Action
letter 3 3 to IPONET, a securities broker/dealer, in response to
IPONET's desire to use the Internet to assist it in attracting
investors.334 This was the first time the SEC had allowed such activity,
though it emphasized that the SEC's normal rules and regulation were
still in effect.335
Unfortunately, with the growth of securities marketing and
securities transactions on the Internet, securities fraud on the Internet
has become more commonplace.336 A significant portion of this fraud
326. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Empowering Investors in an Electronic
Age, Address Before IOSCO Annual Conference 5 (May 17, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch380.htm.
327. Id. at 9. (noting that during the last six months of 1999, three percent of IPOs
were issued on-line).
328. See Walker, supra note 298, at 8.
329. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") is the
"publicly chartered agency that buys qualifying residential mortgages from lenders,
packages them into new securities.., and then resells the securities on the open
market." Downes & Goodman, supra note 29, at 140.
330. Walker, supra note 298, at 8.
331. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7233, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 13, 1995).
332. Id. at 53,459 n.11.
333. A No-Action letter is "requested from the [SEC] wherein the Commission
agrees to take neither civil nor criminal action with respect to the specific activity and
circumstances." Downes & Goodman, supra note 29, at 281.
334. IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,252, at 77,270-77,274 (July 26, 1996). IPONET, which was founded
by Leo Feldman, a registered principal of W.J. Gallagher & Company, Inc., a
securities dealer and underwriter, asked for and received no-action relief from the
SEC in order to post notices of private securities offerings to previously qualified
accredited investors on its password-protected website. Id. at 77,271-77,274.
335. Id.
336. Richard Walker, A Bull Market in Securities Fraud?, Address at the National
Press Club 1 (Apr. 5, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl
speecharchive/1999/spch265.txt. The SEC has received over 1900 complaints
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is the marketing of securities that are patently worthless or complete
shams.3 37  While the SEC has increased its surveillance and
enforcement338 of such fraud, its resources are insufficient to
completely protect the investing public. 39 As noted above, numerous
scams are marketed over the Internet, specifically targeting individual
investors without the financial sophistication to properly evaluate the
worthiness of such offerings.' The Internet provides fraudulent
issuers with the means to instantly offer millions of potential investors
a sham security and then disappear before the SEC has an
opportunity even to recognize the existence of the offering. Just a few
examples of other economically unmarketable securities recently
offered on the Internet include investments in eel farms,3"- prime bank
guarantees, 42 and even shares in a new country. 3  Additionally,
legally unmarketable securities are being sold through the Internet.
One issuer, who raised over three million dollars by selling
unregistered securities in a gambling and lottery enterprise, failed to
satisfy numerous regulatory requirements in order to legally operate
such a business.' These are exactly the types of situations where,
under the Abell and Joseph guidelines, it would be appropriate to
grant private plaintiffs a presumption of reliance based on the fraud-
created-the-market theory. Because of the wide-spread reach of the
Internet, there is the potential for large numbers of investors to be
defraud by such schemes, creating the distinct possibility of class
actions. The fraud-created-the-market theory is especially suited to
class actions brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. 5 Such
regarding misrepresentation in selling a product in the last two years. Investor
Complaints and Questions Continue to Rise, available at http.//%www.sec.gov/
news/data.htm.
337. See Walker, supra note 336, at 3-4, Unger, supra note 326, at 3 (discussing
offering frauds).
338. Unger, supra note 326, at 2 (noting that the SEC's 2000 budget was allocated
an additional $12.5 million for the single aim of improving its ability to regulate the
Internet). The SEC created the Office of Internet Enforcement in 1998 to perform
surveillance and investigation of the Internet for securities fraud, in addition to
coordinating regular sweeps on the Internet. Internet Enforcement Program,
available at http://%vw.sec.gov/divisions/enforceinternetenforce.htm.
339. Walker, supra note 336, at 2,5.
340. Supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
341. SEC v. Daniel Odulo, d/b/a Golden Waters Productions, Litig. Release No.
14591, 1995 WL 493347 (Aug. 7, 1995).
342. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Investing in the Internet Age: What You
Should Know and What Your Computer May Not Tell You ... , Address at the
Association of Retired Persons National Legislative Council Annual Meeting 3 (Feb.
3, 2000), available at http:/vww.sec.gov/newslspeechlspch342.htm.
343. SEC v. Lazarus R. Long dlb/a New Utopia, Litig. Release No. 16110 (Apr. 9,
1999), available at http://wvw.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 6110.txt.
344. SEC v. Pleasure Time, Inc., d/b/a Telephone Information Systems, et al., Litig.
Release No. 15178 (Dec. 6, 1996), available at http.//www.sec.gov/litigationflitreleasesi
Ir15178.txt.
345. Supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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securities are issued by parties, knowing that they are either
economically or legally unmarketable, for the sole purpose of
defrauding investors.
CONCLUSION
The fraud-created-the-market theory is both a valid and necessary
presumption of reliance. It is a natural extension of Congress' goal in
creating the Acts to protect investors and to maintain integrity in the
securities market. A policy limited to full disclosure leaves a loophole
for parties with purely fraudulent intentions. The fraud-created-the-
market theory closes this loophole by easing the plaintiff's
cumbersome burden of proving reliance in situations where actual
reliance is irrelevant because of the defendant's plan to completely
defraud the market. When properly applied, it does not create the
feared investors insurance.
In 1988, before the Internet Age, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
commented on how dramatically the market has changed since the
enactment of the Exchange Act."46 The Court stated, "[t]he modern
securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing
hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by
early fraud cases, and our understanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance
requirement must encompass these differences." 7  The Supreme
Court foresaw the continued changes that the securities industry is
undergoing and that flexibility in applying securities legislation will be
necessary. The fraud-created-the-market theory will continue to be a
necessary tool for plaintiffs in certain Rule 10b-5 causes of action.
346. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988).
347. Id. (citations omitted).
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